

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL AIR STATION WHIDBEY ISLAND
OAK HARBOR, WASHINGTON 98278-5000

NASWHIDBEYINST 5500.11C CH-1
N2:Tr
20 Oct 2000

NASWHIDBEY INSTRUCTION 5500.11C CHANGE TRANSMITTAL 1

Subj: FORCE PROTECTION AND COMMAND SECURITY PLAN

Encl: (1) Revised Page 1
(2) Revised Page iii
(3) Revised Page A-1
(4) Reprinted page A-23 and revised pages A-24 to A-40

1. Purpose. To update the basic directive and to add Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Training, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Perimeter Gates and Fenceline Security Plan, and Barrier Placement paragraphs to Appendix A.

2. Action

a. Make the following pen changes or corrections.

(1) Page 1-5, paragraph 1001.3c(2), after subparagraph (r), add subparagraph "(s) Security, Military Working Dog (MWD) Kennel, building 2815."

(2) Page 1-14, paragraph 1001.16c(5)(a), third line, after the word "business," change the semicolon to a period. Delete the words "or business has purchased liability coverage for employees delivering on base in POVs."

(3) Page 1-14, paragraph 1001.16c(5)(c), first line, delete the comma and the words "in addition to the liability coverage."

(4) Page 10-2, paragraph 1003.4(b), in the Command/Tenant column, after VAQWING, add "NPMOF," and in the Personnel Required column, insert a "1."

(5) Appendix A, page A-4, paragraph 102.4c(2)(g), first line, change the Naval Hospital phone numbers to read "257-9995/9500."

(6) Appendix A, page A-10, paragraph 104.1d, first line, delete "Washington State Patrol."

(7) Appendix A, page A-11, paragraph 104.1e, second line, delete "Washington State Patrol."

(8) Appendix A, page A-11, paragraph 104.2b, second and third lines, delete the words "the Washington State patrol" and insert "NCIS and."

(9) Appendix A, page A-11, paragraph 104.2f, third and fourth lines, delete "Washington State Patrol/."

(10) Appendix A, page A-13, paragraph 104.3j, first and second lines, delete "Washington State Patrol/."

(11) Appendix E, page E-3, paragraph 4, third line, change "(FLAK)" to read "(FLACO)."

(12) Appendix E, page E-3, paragraph 5a, third line, change the words "DDE Roes" to read "DD2 Res."

b. Remove page 1 (cover page) of the basic instruction and replace with the revised page forwarded as enclosure (1).

c. Remove page iii of the basic directive and replace with the revised page iii forwarded as enclosure (2) herewith.

d. Remove page A-1 of the basic directive and replace with the revised page A-1 forwarded as enclosure (3).

e. Replace pages A-23 and A-24 with enclosure (4) of this change transmittal.

/s/
L. G. SALTER

Distribution:
NASWHIDBEYINST 5215.2FF
Lists A through E, and F1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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CH-1 of 20 Oct 2000

NASWHIDBEYINST 5500.11C
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NASWHIDBEY INSTRUCTION 5500.11C

Subj: FORCE PROTECTION AND COMMAND SECURITY PLAN

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5530.14C
(b) OPNAVINST 5530.13B
(c) NASWHIDBEYINST 11450.1
(d) NASWHIDBEYINST 11450.2
(e) NASWHIDBEYINST 1740.5B
(f) NASWHIDBEYINST 5000.1G
(g) OPNAVINST 11200.5C
(h) OPNAVINST 5100.12F
(i) OPNAVINST 5100.25A
(j) Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998)
(k) U. S. Navy Regulations, 1990
(l) NASWHIDBEYINST 5800.1A
(m) NASWHIDBEYINST 4640.4E
(n) NASWHIDBEYINST 11310.1C
(o) SECNAVINST 5510.36
(p) Naval Air Station (NAS) Whidbey Island Security
Department Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
Manual (NOTAL)
(q) NASWHIDBEYINST 2220.1Q
(r) OPNAVINST 5580.1
(s) NASWHIDBEYINST 8600.1
(t) SECNAVINST 5500.29B
(u) SECNAVINST 5510.30A
(v) NASWHIDBEYINST 3710.1R
(w) OPNAVINST 5530.15A
(x) OPNAVINST 5500.33 (A)
(y) NASWHIDBEYINST 3440.1F (A)
(z) NAVHOSPOAKHARBOR/NAVDENCENNORTHWESTINST 3440.1J (NOTAL) (A)

Encl: (1) Force Protection and Command Security Plan

1. Purpose. To promulgate guidance and procedures for physical security measures to safeguard Navy personnel, property, and material on board Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island (NASWI). This instruction has been substantially revised and should be reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. NASWHIDBEYINST 5500.11B

3. Action. Department heads, special assistants, and tenant activities shall promulgate the information contained herein to all members of their departments and shall ensure compliance with its provisions.

APPENDICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A	Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection and Crisis Management Actions Standard Operating Procedures	
PARA	TITLE	PAGE
101	Purpose	A-2
102	Bomb Threats	A-2
103	Sabotage	A-9
104	Hostage or Barricaded Subject	A-10
105	Major Accidents/Disasters	A-13
106	Dissident Activity Alert	A-16
107	Civil Disturbance	A-18
108	Sniper Situation	A-18
109	Hijack Of Aircraft	A-19
110	Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Training	A-24
111	Weapons of Mass Destruction	A-28
112	Perimeter Gates and Fence Line Security Plan	A-35
113	Barrier Placement	A-37
Appendix B	Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS) for Combating Terrorism	
Appendix C	Safety Precautions for Individuals	
Appendix D	Emergency Recall List for Essential Personnel	
Appendix E	Flight Line and Support Facilities Control	

APPENDIX A
ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION
AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARA	TITLE	PAGE
101	Purpose	A-2
102	Bomb Threats	A-2
103	Sabotage	A-9
104	Hostage or Barricaded Subject	A-10
105	Major Accidents/Disasters	A-13
106	Dissident Activity Alert	A-16
107	Civil Disturbance	A-18
108	Sniper Situation	A-21
109	Hijack Of Aircraft	A-22
110	Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Training	A-24
111	Weapons of Mass Destruction	A-28
112	Perimeter Gates and Fence Line Security Plan	A-35
113	Barrier Placement	A-37

- b. Operations Duty Officer.
 - c. Command Duty Officer, 257-2631/2
 - d. Squadron Duty Officer, if applicable.
 - e. NCIS Resident Agent in Charge, 257-3359.
 - f. Commanding Officer/Executive Officer.
3. After it is determined not to be a false alarm notify the following:
- a. FBI, Everett, WA, telephone (425) 252-3500 or FBI, Seattle, WA, telephone (206) 622-0560.
 - b. If the aircraft is "in-flight," the FAA Northwest Regional Duty Officer shall be contacted by the FAA AT Rep (NAS N33, 257-1314). An aircraft is considered to be "in-flight" from the moment the external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when one door is opened for disembarking.
4. Security, Whidbey Precinct
- a. Establish a perimeter around the aircraft or location of suspected hijacker using buildings, vehicles, and ground-handling equipment as cover.
 - b. Make no attempt to board the aircraft (or enter building) to apprehend the suspected hijacker.
 - c. If a hostage has been taken or if the aircraft is being used as a means to extort money or passage to another area, follow the hostage procedures described in hostage or barricaded subjects.
 - d. Ensure that watch personnel are familiar with the Air Terminal facilities, as well as the Operations Department, building 385.
5. As a general rule, an act or statement that would be viewed as hostile by the suspect should be avoided. Any hijacker may be assumed to be either mentally deranged or under unusual mental stress; his/her reactions will be unpredictable and may be violent if triggered by a careless word or action. The

primary objective is to take the suspect into custody without harm to other personnel, the aircraft, or the suspect.

6. The Fire Protection Division Officer shall publish an operating procedure for the response of fire crash vehicles upon receipt of a hijack alert notification.

7. Reports. Any operating unit/activity having knowledge of a suspected or actual hijacking will immediately initiate a telephonic OPREP-3, Event and Incident Report, to appropriate higher headquarters center and follow up with a message OPREP-3, Event and Incident Report per appropriate guidelines.

110. Anti-terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) Training Standards

1. Purpose. The purpose of this section is to establish details for AT/FP training activities for Naval Air Station; Whidbey Island per references (a), (r) and (x).

2. Assumptions

a. Training dollars are at a premium. Extensive use of NCIS and Fleet Training Group Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) should be used to bring training to the installation or Region.

b. Maximize the use of local resources. The State of Washington offers disaster preparedness and other emergency training at no cost to the government.

c. Unit level training which focuses on individual awareness and procedural measures is a low cost, effective means to elevate unit readiness.

3. Mission. On a continuing basis, NAS Whidbey Island and Commander, Navy Region Northwest will provide and conduct AT/FP and disaster preparedness related training in order to prepare individuals, units, and task organized groups to successfully implement this plan. Be prepared to conduct regular unit and installation level training to validate and exercise this plan.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. I intend to maximize every training opportunity available. Safety will be intricately woven into training scenarios. Units responsible for implementing this

plan will aggressively train their personnel. Training should follow a logical progression of complexity. The cornerstone of training will be individual training. Those that are required to execute this plan should be trained to do so. Those individuals will train their units and the task-organized groups. Small pieces of the plan will be exercised, gradually increasing the scenarios in scope and complexity. Endstate: Personnel and tasked-organized groups are trained and prepared to execute any part of this plan in a safe, competent manner.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Pre-incident Phase. This phase focuses on the training of key individuals and units required to execute the plan. Security Whidbey Precinct, Operations Division, Training Branch will coordinate training activities. Units will exercise their operational responsibilities and actively participate in base level training events. Emphasis should be placed on the ability to effectively transition from normal operations to increased readiness with minimal problems. This phase is complete when units are properly and efficiently employed per this plan.

(2) Incident Phase. Individuals and units apply skills developed during the pre-incident phase. This phase is complete upon termination of the incident.

(3) Post-incident Phase. This phase involves collecting and analyzing lessons learned. The lessons learned are used to refine procedures and future training. This phase is complete upon returning to the pre-incident phase, and all lessons learned are incorporated into this plan.

c. Tasks

(1) Force Protection Officer/Security Training Branch

(a) Responsible for coordinating all AT/FP related training activities.

(b) Ensure mandatory Installation level exercises are conducted.

(c) Develop and maintain reference material and training media to support this plan.

(d) Maintain and distribute copies of "The Individuals Guide to Understanding and Surviving Terrorism" and other appropriate pamphlets for our personnel and families.

(e) Ensure AT/FP training requirements are budgeted.

(2) AT/FP Working Group

(a) Prioritize Installation training objectives.

(b) Plan, coordinate, and conduct base level exercises.

(c) Prepare and submit lessons learned per this appendix.

(3) Base and Tenant Activities

(a) Ensure personnel are identified and trained to support this plan.

(b) Identify training requirements to the Force Protection Officer/Security Officer.

(c) Incorporate AT/FP awareness training into General Military Training.

(4) Safety Department Head. Ensure safety concerns and risk management principals are applied to training scenarios.

(5) Department Heads. Ensure personnel deploying or permanently changing station receive the appropriate level of AT training prior to departure. Reference (x) provides amplifying guidance.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) When possible, AT/FP working group members will be Level II AT/FP certified.

(2) Training objectives:

(a) Promote and elevate individual and unit AT/FP awareness.

(b) Develop and sustain individual and unit proficiency in the execution of this plan.

(c) Develop and sustain the ability to competently transition from a state of normal operations into an increased readiness posture.

(d) Develop and sustain the ability to effectively interact with and mutually support other DOD, federal, state, and local agencies during the implementation of this plan.

(e) Security Force Training is contained in Chapter 11 of this plan.

(5) Reference (r) provides a detailed list of formal AT/FP related training courses.

(6) Requests for formal AT/FP schools will be coordinated through the Security Training Branch.

(7) Personnel, their families, and units deploying or permanently changing station will receive Level I training, to include an area specific threat briefing and a DOD travel policy briefing, per reference (x), Appendix 1, AT/FP Levels of Training.

(8) Conduct annual terrorism awareness briefs for civilian and military personnel within your unit. Unit Anti-terrorism Training Officers (ATTOs) can provide this training with the assistance of the Command Security Officer and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

(9) AT/FP training scenarios will be designed to exercise this plan and involve all base and tenant activities roles and responsibilities. Further, they will be a means to identify AT/FP requirements, refine procedures, and focus training.

(10) The Force Protection Officer will submit the Exercise After-Action report as soon as practical after completion of the exercise to the Commanding Officer/Regional Commander. Security Training Branch will retain a copy of lessons learned.

111. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

1. General

a. The threat of WMD terrorism is different than the threat of "NBC" use on a battlefield. As events in Tokyo (1995 Sarin attack), New York City (1993 World Trade Center), and Oregon (1984 Salmonella Bacterium attack) indicate, the use of chemical and biological agents in a terrorist attack are not only possible, but have been well planned and executed. While these attacks have had varying success, it is undeniable that they have terrorized millions. This section outlines the actions NAS Whidbey Island will take to mitigate or prevent the use of WMD aimed at the base.

b. While the fielded U.S. Military is educated, trained, and equipped to operate in a "NBC" environment, the rear areas and non-deployed forces are less so. To a terrorist looking to terrorize the U.S., an installation makes an inviting target. Many areas on the installation naturally tend to congregate large masses of unprotected people i.e., the exchange, schools, the movie theater, and troop formations. Positive, proactive measures should be in place to help lessen the effects of a WMD attack.

2. Assumptions

a. There is an increased possibility of a WMD attack due to the relative ease of access to chemicals, explosives, and plan designs for devices.

b. Procedures for Non-NBC WMD are covered in this appendix.

c. A WMD scenario will exceed the crisis response/consequence management capabilities of base resources.

d. Extensive DOD, state and federal support will be required to cope with a WMD scenario.

e. Incidents involving WMD are often a combination of three types of incidents. Potentially, it could be a hazardous materials incident, a mass casualty incident, and a crime scene.

f. Chemical/biological WMD incidents pose significant problem for first responders.

g. The base should maintain the capability to contain WMD incidents until the arrival of DOD, state and federal response forces.

h. Mass casualty planning shall be in accordance with reference (z).

i. Effective planning, proactive passive/active protective measures and continuous exercising of crisis action plans will mitigate the effects of WMD.

j. The base will maintain Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with appropriate state and federal agencies.

k. The base will maintain Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP).

l. Procedures and protective equipment are required for first responder personnel, i.e., emergency medical services, firefighters, and military policemen. This can include MOPP 4 protective gear, OSHA level A equivalent, detection equipment, and a heightened awareness for the presence of NBC agents.

m. Decontamination measures will consist of rinsing with gross amounts of water/bleach mixture.

n. PPD-39 gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) primary jurisdiction for investigating WMD incidents and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responsibility for consequence management.

3. Mission. On a continuing basis and in conjunction with State and Federal Agencies, NAS Whidbey Island will be prepared to respond to a WMD incident by conducting pre-incident planning and mitigation measures and performing crisis response/consequence management operations aimed at lessening the effects of a WMD incident once they occur.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent. I intend to maintain the capability to respond to a WMD incident and develop comprehensive plans to marshal base, DOD, state, federal and civil resources in this effort. The cornerstone of this appendix lies in our ability to conduct proactive measures prior to a WMD incident. Plans will specifically address how state, federal, and civilian resources

will be incorporated into this plan. Measures that can mitigate the effects of a WMD attack will be implemented where prudent. Endstate: NAS Whidbey Island has viable plans, personnel are trained, and equipped to execute their responsibilities and this plan is exercised periodically.

b. Concept of Operation

(1) Pre-Incident Phase

(a) Develop MOU with external agencies required to support this Appendix.

(b) Consider AT/FP during the design and construction of new buildings.

(c) Implement procedures that lessen the effects of a WMD attack. See Chapters 1 through 5 of this plan, in addition to this appendix.

(d) Maintain an adequate inventory of equipment for 1st responder personnel, i.e., chemical protection suits and detection equipment.

(e) Conduct regular training events to validate and update WMD procedures.

(f) This phase is complete when a WMD incident occurs.

(2) Incident Phase. First responders perform consequence management actions by containing and controlling the incident site, rescuing survivors, performing hasty decontamination, triage and evacuation, and identifying, if possible, the agent. This phase is complete when the immediate threat has been abated and surviving victims have been evacuated for treatment.

(3) Post-incident Phase. This phase involves continuing consequence management action. The incident site is searched for evidentiary material, first responders may require psychological counseling, and response agencies conduct a comprehensive review of actions taken in order to improve procedures. This phase is complete when the area is restored to normal operations.

c. Tasks

(1) Commanding Officer, NASWI

(a) Retain jurisdiction for WMD incidents and be prepared to establish a unified command relationship with responding federal, state, and county forces.

(b) Activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as required.

(c) Exercise command and control through the Crisis Management Team (CMT).

(d) Employ the CMT to deal with the threat.

(2) Security Director, NASWI

(a) Retain primary staff responsibilities for WMD planning.

(b) Ensure training exercises involve WMD scenarios.

(c) Ensure WMD plans integrate available DOD, state and federal response forces and resources.

(d) Recommend activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as required.

(e) Consider implementing increased THREATCON levels.

(f) Prepare and submit installation After-Action Report(s).

(g) Ensure military police officers are equipped and trained to respond to NBC contaminated incident scenes.

(h) Establish procedures for dispatchers to query/identify incoming calls for potential WMD incidents.

(i) Provide on scene command and control per this appendix. Establish perimeter based on weather conditions.

(j) Be prepared to perform hasty decontamination of victims.

(3) Environmental Director

(a) Ensure WMD scenarios involving hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are incorporated into base response procedures and contingency plans.

(b) Ensure base response teams are capable of responding to WMD scenarios involving HAZMAT.

(c) Be prepared to dispose of waste materials from WMD scenarios involving HAZMAT.

(d) Be prepared to test for HAZMAT contamination of drinking water and water drainage areas after a WMD incident.

(4) Special Agent in Charge, NCIS. Ensure all sources of intelligence are used to develop a WMD threat assessment. Consider the following:

(a) Terrorist groups who have used or have the capability to use WMD.

(b) What types of agents have been used?

(c) What are the means of delivery?

(5) On-Scene Commander

(a) Take actions per this appendix.

(b) Perform priority of work per paragraph 3.d.(1) below.

(c) Forward operational and logistical requirements to the EOC.

(d) Establish a decontamination site.

(e) Identify the chemical/biological agent if possible. Commercial HAZMAT containers have Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and can be referenced to determine containment and safety procedures.

(f) Take all prudent measures to contain and/or mitigate the effects of the attack.

(g) Determine weather conditions at incident site.
Be prepared to evacuate downwind areas.

(h) Establish safety zone, i.e., Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones.

(6) Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Oak Harbor

(a) Ensure Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel are equipped and trained to handle NBC contaminated victims.

(b) Provide an on-scene medical officer to coordinate/supervise triage and evacuation actions.

(c) Advise local hospitals to prepare for the receipt of NBC contaminated victims.

(d) Be prepared to execute the Mass Casualty Plan contained in reference (z)

(e) Establish a procedure for patient tracking and accountability.

(7) Supply Officer. Refer to reference (y), enclosure (1).

(8) Public Affairs Officer. Refer to reference (y), enclosure (1).

(9) Comptroller/Financial Resources Manager. Refer to reference (y), enclosure (1).

(10) Operations Officer. Refer to reference (y), enclosure (1).

(11) Officer in Charge, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

(a) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.

(b) Be prepared to perform and render safe an NBC device in an NBC environment.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Priority of consequence management actions for incident responders:

- (a) Control/containment of incident site and surrounding areas.
- (b) Identify agent if chemicals were used.
- (c) Perform rescue operations for survivors.
- (d) Decontamination of injured.
- (e) Triage and evacuation of injured.
- (f) Collection and preservation of evidence.
- (g) Collection and identification of the deceased.
- (h) Site clean up and HAZMAT disposal.
- (i) Return incident site to normal operations.

(2) The installation's primary responsibility is containment of the agent and the rescue of individuals believed to have survived.

(3) Victims of a chemical or biological agent attack will be decontaminated before evacuation to a medical facility. Patient decontamination is achieved by:

- (a) Remove victim from Hot Zone.
- (b) Remove contaminated clothing.
- (c) Rinse with gross quantities of water and/or using various decontamination solutions.

(4) Identification/classification of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials is obtained by using various detection devices.

(a) Biological Smart Tickets can be used to identify biological warfare agents Bacillus Anthracis (Anthrax), Yersinia

Pestic (Plague), Botulism (Bot Pox), and Staphylococcus Entertoxin B (SEB).

(b) Chemical warfare agents are detected using various detection kits, including M256A1 kits, Dragger Calorimetric tubes, M8 and M9 paper, Photoionization detectors, APD 2000 chemical warfare agent detectors, etc. Responding local, state or federal agencies may provide these kits.

(c) Nuclear materials are detected by using an AN/PRD-77 Radiac Set. The PDR-77 detects and measures alpha, beta, and gamma and x-ray radiation. Responding local, state or federal agencies may provide these kits.

(5) Reference (z) contains a list of area medical facilities with the ability to treat NBC contaminated victims.

(6) Develop MOAs which support this appendix.

112. Perimeter Gates and Fenceline Security Plan

1. Purpose. During security emergencies or increased THREATCON levels, NAS Whidbey has the resources to supplement existing perimeter security measures. This annex discusses the concept for using barriers at gates, security fencelines, and other locations as directed by the emergency.

2. Perimeter Security Measures. Perimeter security measures used for routine security operations at NAS Whidbey include:

- a. Standard security fencing and signs in place.
- b. NAS Whidbey Security routinely patrols boundary roads, and flight line.
- c. Unused gates and certain areas of the fenceline have been augmented with concrete barriers to reinforce their strength against a vehicle crashing through the fence. Perimeter gates are secured with security locks. The opening of such is authorized by the Security Director or Physical Security Assist Team.
- d. Physical Security Assist Team will control and hold the gate keys.

e. Active gates are manned by armed Security personnel who provide access control.

3. Supplemental Perimeter Security Measures. The following are examples of supplementary security measures that may be used on base for security emergencies. Select measures based upon the incident at hand. For example, an incident may require a protective barrier in one location, but not all over the base. When these measures are in effect, base access and intra-base movement will be impacted; therefore, security measures must be coordinated with tenant commands and NAS departments prior to use. Barriers will be placed at strategic locations as needed per this appendix.

4. Prestaging and Schedule Changes During Exercises. Supplemental measures are applied as appropriate during increased THREATCON levels, as a means of gradually increasing the base security posture. The gate mazes and the strategic placement of barriers will slow base operations and may require four to six hours to implement. As a matter of expediency and financial efficiency, supplemental security measures are considered optional during exercises, as directed by the Commanding Officer, NAS Whidbey. When budget constraints limit exercise time, barriers may be pre-staged to allow more time for security force training.

5. Barrier Maze for Perimeter Gates. Perimeter mazes are placed at designated perimeter gates during heightened THREATCON levels (BRAVO and above). The maze forces incoming vehicles to decelerate as they approach the gate, preventing gate running. The maze also provides a visible deterrent to potential terrorists. Ault Field: Langley and Porter Perimeter Gates are the designated maze locations. However, other gates may be supplemented as necessary (e.g., Nortz Gate and Hospital Gate, which have limited hours of operation). Seaplane Base entrances: Maui gate on East Pioneer Way, Wake Avenue, and Torpedo Road procedures are listed below.

a. Implementation. The Security Director will coordinate with the Commanding Officer during higher THREATCONs to determine when and where the maze barriers will be placed, situational dependent. If exercise barriers are to be pre-staged, the Whidbey Security Precinct and the Base Operating Support Contractor (BOSC) will coordinate this effort. Keep Commander, Navy Region Northwest informed of barrier plans.

b. Notification. Use all means possible to inform base personnel of the use of mazes and barriers, as soon as possible, to ensure that traffic flow continues as smoothly as possible.

c. Maze Vehicles for Maui Gate and Wake Avenue. Require no less than three heavy-duty moveable vehicles. For safety reasons, no explosive trucks (e.g., fuel trucks) will be used. Vehicles will be driven by personnel qualified to operate each vehicle. The BOSC will provide heavy-duty vehicles for mazes, but type will vary, depending on availability. Vehicles must be no less than two-ton stake trucks.

d. Emergency Movement of Maze Vehicles. Maze vehicles must be moved rapidly should an emergency occur at a perimeter gate. BOSC contractor will provide drivers as necessary to support this requirement. They will also remove barriers when required.

e. Barrier Placement. Refer to paragraph 113 of this appendix.

6. Moveable Barriers at Perimeter Fenceline and Other Locations. Certain locations on the base's boundary fenceline have been identified as vulnerable points for possible vehicle penetration, which could provide intruders with an avenue of entry to NASWI mission critical assets. These locations, or others identified during the incident, may be reinforced with rolling barriers or concrete blocks during heightened THREATCONS. This action depends on barriers available and the determination to augment certain locations.

a. Decision to Use. The Security Director and the Force Protection Officer will determine if and where additional barriers may be needed.

b. Notification. Notify the following when additional barriers are to be used.

(1) Base Fire Department: 257-2533

(2) Weapons Department: 257-2402

113. Barrier Placement

1. Purpose. The purpose is to establish guidelines for placement of water filled barriers at Ault Field and SeaPlane Base vehicle access points on NAS Whidbey Island. These

guidelines supplement reference (x) and other security measures during increased THREATCON levels. Barrier mazes will be placed at designated perimeter gates to provide a deceleration zone and to prevent base entry by running through either the base entry or exit gates. The maze also provides a visible deterrent to potential terrorists.

2. Definitions

a. Barriers. Items used to restrict or reduce vehicular access through designated ingress/egress points to property under the control of NAS Whidbey Island. These may be comprised of any material sufficient for the task, and are more commonly used throughout this plan as "Barrier Mazes."

b. Barricades. Items used to reinforce perimeter access points, including non-operational gates, secure roadways, etc. Barricades may be comprised of any material(s) sufficient for the task, and are most commonly used to prevent access.

3. Responsibility. The BOSC will be notified at 257-3358 (24-hour trouble desk) to transport barriers from the staging compound to the designated gates. Time frame for an emergency call is 1 to 2 hours. Security personnel will place the barriers in pre-designated, marked areas upon delivery by the contractor. When the maze system is to be used the NAS Fire Department (257-2532) needs to be notified as soon as possible to fill the barriers with water.

4. Gates/Access Points

a. Main Gate (Langley Gate)

(1) Barriers will be staged in the building 349 parking lot adjacent to the inbound lanes of travel.

(2) Barriers will be placed as shown in attachments (1) through (3). The outbound gate will be secured and outbound traffic routed through the inbound lane. Inbound traffic will be routed around building 349.

(3) Security patrol personnel must ensure that all truck traffic is routed through Charles Porter Gate. All other access points are restricted to POVs and standard-sized vehicles.

b. Charles Porter Gate

(1) Barriers will be staged on the right-hand side of the roadway shoulder of the outbound lane of traffic inside the gate.

(2) Barriers staged at this gate will be placed as shown in attachment (4). This placement allows for a rolling slow down in both inbound and outbound lanes of traffic.

c. Hospital Gate

(1) Barriers will be staged on the right-hand side of the roadway shoulder of the outbound lane of traffic inside the gate.

(2) Barriers staged at this gate will be placed as shown in attachment (5). This placement allows for both the inbound and outbound lanes of traffic to be mazed inside the gate.

d. Nortz Gate

(1) Barriers will be staged on the right-hand side of the roadway shoulder of the inbound lane of traffic (graveled area).

(2) Barriers staged at this gate will be placed as shown in attachment (6). This placement allows both the inbound and outbound lanes of traffic to be mazed inside the gate.

e. Torpedo Road Gate

(1) Barriers will be staged on the right-hand side of the roadway shoulder of the outbound lane of traffic (graveled area).

(2) Barriers staged in this area will be placed as shown in attachment (7). This placement will allow for a rolling slow down in both inbound and outbound lanes of traffic.

(3) This will be the main point of entry and exit for all vehicle traffic to include delivery trucks, oversized vehicles (e.g., buses, heavy equipment, Island Transit etc.). All motorists will be advised to use Torpedo Road Gate to enter and exit the SeaPlane Base.

20 Oct 2000

4. Exercises. The Whidbey Security Precinct will coordinate with the BOSC, via Public Works, when barriers are to be pre-staged for exercises. Full configuration of barriers may not always be used, and barriers may be moved to the roadside to accommodate peak traffic periods. The BOSC will stage barriers at all gates and remove barriers when no longer needed. Barriers will be returned to the Security Storage Compound, located behind building 220.

MAIN GATE MAZE SET UP



MAIN GATE MAZE SET UP



CHARLES PORTER GATE MAZE

10 Yellow Barriers



HOSPITAL GATE MAZE

9 Yellow Barriers



NORTZ GATE MAZE

14 Yellow Barriers



TORPEDO ROAD GATE MAZE

9 Yellow Barriers

